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toward the Asia-Pacific region and provides implementation guidance. This guidance places high priority on relationships with allies and partners and directs relationship expansion throughout the theater. The AirSea Battle concept has ignited a debate on the role of landpower in the Asia-Pacific, as well as the Army's role in ASB. But the argument should not be "How can the Army get into the Pacific?" The Army is already there and has been for decades. ASB as a strategy, while a useful and necessary approach to portions of the Asia-Pacific security challenge, neglects the reality of partner nation defense establishments which are overwhelmingly dominated by land forces -both in sheer numbers and leadership. The majority of the Asia-Pacific security apparatus is land centric; therefore, landpower is critical to execute the guidance. This paper examines how landpower can be applied to build and strengthen relationships while keeping U.S. forces trained and ready, and the paper demonstrates why landpower could become a main effort in achieving desired end states.
The Asia Pacific Rebalance: Tipping the Scale with Landpower
The Defense Strategic Guidance, published in January 2012, describes a rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region and provides implementation guidance. This guidance places high priority on relationships with allies and partners and directs relationship expansion throughout the theater. In addition, the guidance emphasizes building partner capacity and seeks to achieve these objectives through exercises and rotational units. 1 While there are many rebalance options being debated, one prominent concept under consideration is Air-Sea Battle (ASB). This concept has ignited a debate on the role of landpower in the Asia-Pacific, as well as the Army's role in ASB. The argument should not be "How can the Army get into the Pacific?" The Army is already there and has been for decades. ASB as a strategy, while a useful and necessary approach to portions of the Asia-Pacific security challenge, neglects the reality of partner nation defense establishments which are overwhelmingly dominated by land forces -both in sheer numbers and leadership. The majority of the Asia-Pacific security apparatus is land centric; therefore, landpower is critical to execute the guidance. Through persistent engagement and forward presence, landpower can be applied in ways that build and strengthen relationships, keep U.S. forces trained and ready, and could become a main effort in achieving desired end states. This paper examines how landpower can be applied to build and strengthen relationships while keeping U.S. forces trained and ready, and the paper will demonstrate why landpower could become a main effort in achieving desired end states. The structure of the paper is as follows: a brief background that describes the overarching guidance from the United States Government, Department of Defense, and United States Pacific Command, from which U.S. Army Pacific strategy is derived and supports; an overview of the Pacific Theater that describes the current and future environments that must drive the strategy; an explanation of the United States Army and Army Pacific strategies; and a discussion of strategy enhancement options and recommendations.
Rebalancing Toward the Asia Pacific
The guidance to rebalance toward the Pacific, or "Pacific Pivot," was not initially provided in any of the usual strategic guidance documents. The recognizes this role and notes: "Accordingly, while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region." 6 The purpose of the rebalance and its implementation has been broadly debated within the U.S. and throughout the world. Many saw the rebalance as an effort to contain a rising China. States, and Mexico." 16 The ocean transits 50% of the world's container cargo and 70%
of the world's ship borne energy, which leads some to describe the Pacific region as "water dominated." 17 Focusing only on the vast ocean and sea borne commerce, however, discounts the reality that land forces dominate most of the militaries of the nations in the Pacific. Of the thirty-six resident nations, of which twenty-seven have militaries, the army is the largest force in twenty-six of them and twenty-one has Army officers as their Chief of Defense. In addition, the AOR is home to seven of the world's ten largest armies. These characteristics make landpower an essential part of a successful engagement strategy. As noted in the USARPAC paper "Partnering in the The strategy is based on collaboration and cooperation, not containment of China as some have suggested. 24 This strategy is built upon strong relationships, designed to shape a security environment that maintains the peace and stability; however, it cannot be successfully executed solely from the air and sea. The 2012 Army Strategic
Planning Guidance notes, "Shaping is an enduring, daily requirement and is emerging as a core competency of the Army." 25 Relationships are built, strengthened, and maintained through human interaction, in the human domain, on land.
Secretary Panetta's June 2012 speech declared that the Army will maintain a significant presence in Korea; however, the speech does not provide specific guidance for Army efforts in the Pacific. 26 The Army's Role in the Asia-Pacific Rebalance
To help USPACOM achieve its goals, the United States Army Pacific developed a Theater Army Strategy that describes how USARPAC "demonstrates the potential for decisive land domain operations in the USPACOM AOR." 27 The strategy is based on four core tenets. Enhance ("Enhance Critical Capabilities") efforts focus on countries with limited ability to operate outside their borders. USARPAC Enhance activities strive to increase partners' ability to participate in multilateral operations such as PKO or HADR to battalion level.
When policy constrains the defense activities that are permitted with a country, the country is categorized in the Open category ("Open New Relationships"). Typical activities include senior leader dialogue and subject matter expert exchanges, but these activities must first be approved by USPACOM or OSD. The final grouping of countries is Sustain ("Sustain Traditional Relationships"). Given a constrained resource operating environment, Sustain activities strive to maintain positive relationships and access to countries with limited ability to contribute to regional security. 34 In total, these five categories provide a framework for executing a strategy to support USARPAC's main effort and help achieve the nation's strategic objective of maintaining security and stability through stronger relationships throughout the Asia-Pacific. For the past 11 years he hasn't had his Army, while they were committed to operations in CENTCOM, and rightfully so. But now we are back." 35 The forces that are going back to the Pacific possess years of experience in security cooperation activities and partner capacity building. They also know how to build and strengthen relationships through cultural understanding, transparency, and mutual trust.
The following sections propose a number of options for strategy enhancement:
expanding ongoing engagement and exercise activities, focusing efforts to increase access and grow relationships with rising powers, opening relationships with countries where activities have previously been limited by sanctions or policy, and capitalizing on the developing regional alignment of forces (RAF) concept by further aligning forces to specific regions within the theater and developing a personnel assignment mechanism that preferentially assigns those with specific theater experience into units with similar focus and alignment.
Strategy Enhancement Options Protect the Expansion of Security Cooperation
The more we can do on engagement, the better. It is easy to say no on email, when you do not know someone. But it is much tougher face to face, especially when you have a relationship that has been built over time through personal interaction. These relationships are a critical component of staying in Phase 0. Expanded SCP focused on building relationships with rising powers Historically, security cooperation activities in the Pacific have focused primarily on 13 treaty allies (Australia, Japan, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand) and have comprised a majority of funding and major exercises. 40 This focus was understandable with more limited resources available for security cooperation and the critical importance of our relationships with them. These countries continue to be major contributors to security and stability in the region, and our relationships must be maintained through the sustainment of the strategy of persistent engagement and military exercises. 41 In fact, the USPACOM theater engagement strategy focuses on strengthening the alliances. According to ADM Locklear, "These alliances are historic, and they underpin our strategy in the region. We are going to put more time and effort into making sure that those relationships are built for the future." 42 Our allies know we are there, and we will continue to be there for them in the future. However, as security cooperation activity expands, the majority of the added resources should be applied in areas that have experienced less engagement in the past, especially with countries whose growing economies portend a greater presence and involvement in the Asia-Pacific of the future. For example, the region is home to China, India, and Indonesia, three rising powers whose importance in the Pacific is growing and with whom the U.S. military has not had a strong relationship over the past years. "These countries are going to be critical in the future, and we have an entire generation of officers who don't know us, they know something else, because we haven't been there….it is incredibly important to build relationships with them, and it starts with engagement and building trust, and then exercises, but it is all about personal contact." 43 LTG Wiercinski notes that officers of these nations' armies must know who Americans really are. They won't get that information from "books, rumors, 14 or media." 44 A country with a rapidly growing economy, Indonesia is becoming an "increasingly important contributor to regional security." 45 Since 2008 the United States military's relationship has steadily improved with Indonesia through cooperation in areas such as maritime security, counterterrorism, and disaster relief. 46 An expanded security cooperation program that increases engagement and exercises will continue to strengthen this relationship. Like Indonesia, India's growing economy will almost certainly lead to an expansion of its regional importance and influence. According to ADM Locklear, "Building a strong military relationship with India builds an understanding and deepens established ties that will contribute to the larger Asia-Pacific region." 47 He further notes, however, that while maritime cooperation between the U.S. and India was "quite productive," there are opportunities to expand cooperation in other areas such as counterterrorism and disaster response. 48 The opportunity to strengthen military ties with rising powers such as India and Indonesia are too important to neglect. There is, however, no more important rising power relationship than the U.S. relationship with China. According to Secretary
Panetta, "China's rise has brought millions out of poverty and helped make the world a more prosperous place. I believe that it can also make the world a more secure place, if we work together to build an enduring foundation of military to military relations between the United States and China." 49 Recent military cooperation exercises such as a U.S.-China counter-piracy exercise last fall 50 and engagements at senior levels of the military have begun to build this foundation. In addition, USARPAC recently conducted a disaster management exercise with China. According to LTG Wiercinski, "The exercise was a great example of going forward on things that are critically important to all of us, where we are going to need cooperation, and allows us to build relationships and engage in order to maintain Phase 0 that is critical out here." 51 Exercises that are focused on areas in which both sides agree, such as disaster management and counter-piracy, are a great way to build a relationship and increase transparency so that more difficult subjects are less difficult to approach. An Asia-Pacific strategy of cooperation and collaboration with an expanded security cooperation program must include a deliberate effort to enhance relations with rising powers whose influence will increase over the coming years. No relationship is more important than the one with China.
Opening relationships with countries currently or previously sanctioned by US Policy for contingency response or participation in exercises, their focus on a specific subregion or nation will improve their ability to prepare by learning about history, language, and culture. The reality, however, is that the individuals in these units will continue to rotate to other assignments. Over time the institutional knowledge gained through engagements and exercises will erode. To maximize the effect of regional partnership and regional alignment this erosion should be minimized. Lengthening the duration of assignments to a unit would be one approach, but this would be difficult due to professional development requirements (assignments, schooling) and other Army needs. A better approach would be a policy of preferential return assignments, in which an officer or non-commissioned officer is reassigned to regionally focused units where 18 he or she has experience. According to Foreign Policy the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, wants to develop a program for Asia that is modeled after certain aspects of the Af-Pak Hands program, which sought to develop institutional knowledge through education and experience of a cadre of NCOs and officers. 56 The details of the program have not been announced; however, when this program is implemented, it should include preferential return assignments to help avoid the erosion of gains made through previous engagements and exercises. Although it will not always be possible, it is important to maximize the benefits of returning an experienced individual, especially at the critical senior command levels. Otherwise we cannot hope to build the trust and confidence we need to be successful building a strong relationship." interaction has been limited by U.S. policy in a way that supports continued security and stability without detracting from our commitment to our treaty allies. Landpowers' ability to engage in the human domain will help maintain security and stability in a theater at peace. It will also maintain and strengthen relationships through engagements and exercises which will be a cost far less expensive, both in dollars and blood.
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